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THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT OF 1978
The Bank Secrecy Act' requires financial institutions to maintain certain
records that have a "high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regula-
tory proceedings," 2 but it contains no procedures whereby the government
can secure this information. . Although an individual's private papers gen-
erally are protected from compulsory production, 4 such protection was de-
nied to records maintained pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act in United
States v. Miller. 5 After Miller, a government authority could request a
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1976). The Bank Secrecy Act is implemented through the regula-
tions found in Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 31
C.F.R. §§ 103.11-51 (1978).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a) (1976). The purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act is to aid government
agencies and departments in obtaining the evidence needed to prosecute white collar crimes.
Although it is primarily concerned with the illegal use of secret foreign bank accounts, the Bank
Secrecy Act applies to domestic activities such as tax evasion, securities manipulation, organized
crime, and other illegal businesses like gambling, drug trafficking, and loan sharking. Amend the
Bank Secrecy Act: Hearings on S. 3814 and S. 3828 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings].
Among the records that must be maintained by financial institutions are copies of both sides
of any check in excess of $100.00 that is deposited into or withdrawn from an individual's bank
account. These records must be maintained for a minimum of five years. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.34,
103.36 (1978). The exclusion of checks for less than $100.00 from the requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act is only a cosmetic exemption. It is more expensive for banks to go through checks
and exclude those for less than $100.00 than to microfilm all of them. Banks, therefore, choose
the latter procedure. The Safe Banking Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 9086 Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. 1592 (1977) (statement of Morris F.
Miller) [hereinafter cited as The Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings].
3. Legislative history, however, suggested that access to bank records under the Bank Se-
crecy Act would be regulated. The Senate Banking Committee's report stated:
Access by law enforcement officials to bank records required to be kept under this
title would, of course, be only pursuant to a subpoena or other lawful process as is
presently the case. The legislation in no way authorizes unlimited fishing expedi-
tions into a bank's records on the part of law enforcement officials.
S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). Unfortunately, this legislative intent never was
realized for the regulations issued to implement the Bank Secrecy Act did not outline any
procedures. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11-.51 (1978).
4. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court held that the fourth
and fifth amendments protect an individual's private papers from compulsory production to the
government. This propostion has been reaffirmed continually by the Supreme Court in dicta.
See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974); United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950),
5. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The Supreme Court in Miller expressly stated that a depositor
possesses no fourth amendment interest in his bank records and, therefore, lacks standing to
challenge a subpoena requesting their production. These records belong to the bank. Thus, the
depositor does not have any constitutional protection that Boyd made applicable to private pa-
pers since he or she cannot assert either ownership or possession. Id. at 440. The Court further
stated that a depositor has no "reasonable expectation" of privacy in his financial records be-
cause they only contain information that he or she voluntarily conveyed to the bank, and
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bank to produce an individual's records without any legal process, or notice
to the individual, or a showing of cause. 6
In response to both the impact of the Miller decision 7 and a report pre-
pared by the Privacy Protection Study Commission,8 Congress recently passed
thereby exposed to its employees. 1d. at 442. The defendant argued that the element of com-
pulsion embodied in the Bank Secrecy Act created a fourth amendment interest in his financial
records. Id. at 441. The Court responded that a "lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy
concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank
Secrecy Act .. " Id. at 442.
This concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in determining fourth amendment rights
was established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The quoted phrase itself comes
from Justice Harlan's concurring 6pinion in which he set forth two requirements for protection
from intrusion under the fourth amendment. "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Id. at 361. Any activity that is exposed to the public, how-
ever, is not protected by the fourth amendment. Id. at 351. See also Kitch, Katz v. United
States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133; Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 968 (1968).
For cases applying Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" theory see United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's handwriting since it
is repeatedly shown to the public); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the tone of one's voice since it is constantly exposed to the
public); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in financial records given to an accountant for preparation of income tax returns since disclosure
of much of that information will be required on the returns); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751-53 (1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations discussing illegal ac-
tivities with an associate who turns out to be a police informer since that is a risk anyone
dealing in illegal activities must assume); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (a reasonable
expectation of privacy about himself or herself as an individual walks down the street); Mancusi
v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (a reasonable expectation of privacy in union records kept
in a private office at union headquarters).
6. The Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1462 (statement of Fortney H.
Stark, Jr.). The government would only have to resort to legal procedures if the bank refused its
request for the records. Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 64 (statement
of Eugene T. Rossides). The problem with this process is that the entire burden is placed on
the financial institution since it alone would decide whether or not the government gained
access to an individual's financial records. Id. at 46. The bank customer had no voice in this
decision and after Miller, he or she had no standing to challenge the methods by which the
government obtained the financial records. Thus, the party with the greatest interest in insuring
that the government's demands were proper had no part in determining or challenging the
validity of these demands. Furthermore, if the bank decided to challenge the government's
request for an individual's financial records, the bank had no standing to assert the individual's
privacy interests. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974).
7. After Miller, the government could informally obtain access to an individual's financial
records. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. This is an important right for the government
since financial records reveal more than an individual's financial affairs. These records virtually
provide a current biography which reveals "much about a person's activities, associations, and
beliefs." California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
See also The Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1467 (statement of Fortney J.
Stark, Jr.), which recounts a segment of a documentary television show where the cancelled
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the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 9 This legislation is signifi-
cant because it recognizes a legal right to privacy in financial records for the
checks of a member of the Commission on Privacy Protection were examined by a private
investigator 3,000 miles away. The investigator, without any other information, was able to
discern everything about this individual's personal and family life.
Therefore, it is reasonable for an individual to have an expectation of privacy concerning
financial records. See Note, No Expectation of Privacy in Bank Records-United States v. Mil-
ler, 26 DEPAUL L. REv.146 (1976); Note, Is There a Right of Privacy in Bank Records? Differ-
ent Answers to the Same Question-California v. Federal Law, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 378
(1977); Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439 (1974). In fact most banks
regard information concerning customers' accounts to be confidential. See 118 CONG. REC.
23494-99 (1972) (printed responses to letters sent by the ACLU to 100 of America's largest
banks requesting information about their confidentiality policies); Right to Financial Privacy Act:
Hearings on S. 1343 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-116 (1976) (statements of various
members of the banking business) [hereinafter cited as Right to Financial Privacy Act
Hearings]; The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act: Hearings on S. 2200 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 178 (1974) (statement of Harold B. Arthur) [hereinafter cited as The Effect of the Bank
Secrecy Act Hearings]; The Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1478-1504
(statement of L. Richard Fischer, attorney for Crocker National Bank of California).
The Miller Court, however, stated that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in finan-
cial records because an individual voluntarily exposes this information to the public. 425 U.S. at
442. This statement totally ignores the fact that today most financial transactions are performed
through checks and credit cards. Since "cash only" transactions are impractical and ultimately
unreasonable, individuals are forced to deal with financial institutions and the implications of
the Bank Secrecy Act. Role of the Internal Revenue Service in Law Enforcement Activities:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administration of the Internal Revenue Code of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 98 (1975-1976). The impact of the Miller deci-
sion upon an individual's financial affairs becomes more overwhelming as we move towards the
complete computerization of banking through the Electronic Funds Transfer System. For a
discussion of the rights and responsibilities of consumers, financial institutions, and government
agencies and departments under this system, see EFT IN THE UNITED STATES, POLICY REC-
OMMENDATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST-THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (1977).
8. Congress created the Privacy Protection Study Commission in the Privacy Act of 1974. 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976). Its purpose was to study all the information systems of governmental,
regional, and private organizations in order to determine the standards and procedures in force
for the protection of personal information. On the basis of this study, the Commission was to
make any legislative recommendations that it considered to be necessary in order to protect the
privacy of individuals while still meeting the legitimate informational needs of government and
society. See PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY- THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION xv (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY].
The Privacy Commission emphasized the need to provide the individual with a "legally rec-
ognized interest he can assert to protect records about himself when government agencies seek
to acquire them" from a financial institution. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY, supra at 352. The
checking account has emerged as "an economic and social diary." Id. at 101. Congress, there-
fore, must recognize that an individual's financial records are to some extent his private records
and create a protectible interest "that reflects a legitimate expectation of confidentiality in those
records." Id. at 352.
9. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 is Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reg-
ulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12
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first time. It also is important because it establishes procedures regulating
the disclosure of financial information to government agencies and depart-
ments. 10
This Note will discuss major provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It first will analyze the pro-
cedures established to govern access to financial records. Particular emphasis
will be placed upon the provisions allowing access to financial records by
search warrant, formal written request, and in emergency situations because
these procedures are presently inadequate. Recommendations for improve-
ment also will be made, Another major focus of this Note will be upon the
customer challenge provision of the Act, since this provision is of vital im-
portance to a customer seeking to retain the confidentiality of his financial
records.
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO RECORDS
Under the Act, no government authority can acquire an individual's finan-
cial records that are kept by a financial institution unless the records are
reasonably described. 11 The government authority also must follow one of
five prescribed procedures: customer authorization, administrative or judicial
subpoena, search warrant, or formal written request. 12 These are significant
because they regulate the manner in which financial records can be ob-
tained 13 and force the government to leave a paper trail of its investiga-
tions. 14 Thus, by prohibiting informal and undocumented access to an indi-
U.S.C.A. § 3401 (Supp. 1978)). The Act was passed on November 10, 1978 and became effec-
tive on March 12, 1979.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 1383].
11. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (Supp. 1978). A blanket provision requesting all of an individual's
financial records, therefore, is insufficient to meet this requirement. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra
note 10, at 49-50. The requirement that the request must be reasonably described is rooted in
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court
in Oklahoma Press Publish. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946) stated:
[T]he Fourth [Amendment], if applicable [to a request for records], at the most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the
things required to be 'particularly described'. . . . The gist of the protection is in
the requirement .... that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable ...
[T]he requirement of reasonableness . . . comes down to [whether] specification of
the documents to be produced [is] adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of
the relevant inquiry.
See also notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text infra.
12. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (Supp. 1978).
13. Before the Act was passed, the government did not have to use certain procedures to
request financial records. Therefore, informal requests were usually honored by financial institu-
tions. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. Under the Act, however, financial institutions
are prohibited from releasing financial records unless one of the prescribed procedures are
followed. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
14. Prior to the Act, a government authority could informally obtain an individual's financial
records. A written request was not required. See note 6 supra. Usually a government agent
would visit a bank and orally request the records. See Surveillance: Hearings Before the Sub-
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vidual's records, the Act's procedures promote effective oversight of gov-
ernment activity.
Customer Authorization
A customer may authorize disclosure of his or her records by furnishing a
signed and dated consent statement to both the financial institution and the
government authority requesting the disclosure. 15 Customer authorizations
probably will be used infrequently, however, since an individual involved in
illegal activities is not likely to consent to an investigation. 16 Hence, it will
probably be one of the least utilized provisions of the Act.
Administrative or Judicial Subpoena
Another method by which a government authority may obtain financial
records is pursuant to an administrative or judicial subpoena. 17 Administra-
tive subpoenas are issued by authorized agencies 18 to enable them to carry
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 507 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Surveillance Hearings]. Under
these circumstances, it would be difflcult for an individual to discover how his financial records
were obtained by government investigators. Also, financial information could be freely transfer-
red between agencies. See Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1563 (statement
of Dept. of Justice). Without any written documents, the identity of the agency that originally
requested the records could be completely lost during these transfers. The Act, however, re-
quires every request to be in writing. See note 55 infra. This enables an individual to discover
what records were investigated, by what agency, and for what purpose. The Act also requires
that any request to transfer information between agencies be in writing. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3412(a)
(Supp. 1978). Thus, these provisions force the government to leave a paper trail of an investiga-
tion that can be traced by the bank customer.
15. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404(a) (Supp. 1978). The consent statement also:
(1) authorizes such disclosure for a period not in excess of three months;
(2) states that the customer may revoke such authorization at any time before the
financial records are disclosed;
(3) identifies the financial records which are authorized to be disclosed;
(4) specifies the purposes for which, and the Government authority to which, such
records may be disclosed; and
(5) states the customer's rights under this chapter.
id.
16. Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. of Government Operations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976) (statement of Richard L, Thornburgh) [hereinafter cited as
Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS]. In fact, it has often been the subject's
refusal which has forced government investigators to obtain records from a financial institution.
Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 89 (statement of Eugene T. Rossides).
17. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405, 3407 (Supp. 1978).
18. The general congressional authority for an administrative subpoena is found in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1976). The authority of a particular agency to
issue an administrative subpoena, however, is created by specific statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 uuu(a) (1976) (authority for the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue subpoenas);
1979] 1063
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out their investigative duties. 19 Agencies, however, have no power to en-
force administrative subpoenas and compliance must be secured through a
court order. 20 In contrast, judicial subpoenas, issued under the seal of the
court, are used as part of the discovery process in a pending court case or to
procure evidence for trial. 21
Before the subpoena is issued, the government must demonstrate that the
subpoena is authorized by law and sought pursuant to a legitimate law en-
forcement inquiry. 22 A copy of the subpoena together with notice of the
right to challenge it must be served upon the customer. This requirement
can be met by mailing the notice to the customer's last known address on or
before the date on which the subpoena is served on the financial institu-
tion. 23 Grand jury subpoenas are exempted from these provisions. 24
Search Warrant
Search warrants issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure 25 also may be used by a government authority to obtain financial rec-
ords. 26  A search warrant will be issued if the government can convince a
I.R.C. § 7602 (authority for the Internal Revenue Service to issue subpoenas). Usually these
statutes allow the agencies to delegate the subpoena power. Typically each agency adopts its
own regulations specifying which employees have the authority to issue an administrative sub-
poena. Those delegated with subpoena power can include regional directors, bureau heads, the
general counsel, or anyone conducting an investigation. B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, J. GRUFF, 3
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 20.02, at 20-18 to 20-25 [hereinafter cited as B. MEZINES].
19. B. MEZINES, supra note 18, § 20.01, at 20-11.
20. Id. § 21.01, at 21-3.
21. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45; Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.
22. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405, 3407 (Supp. 1978).
23. Id. Before the passage of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, a government
agency which subpoenaed an individual's records from a financial institution was not required to
give notice to the individual. Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 46
(statement of Eugene T. Rossides). Some banks, however, had their own policy of contacting
the customer when a subpoena for his records was received. See The Safe Banking Act of 1977
Hearings, supra note 2, at 1478-79 (statement of L. Richard Fischer). Congress began to recog-
nize the potential for abuse that resulted when the customer was not given notice of a govern-
ment request for his financial records. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, therefore, created a special
procedure for third-party summons which included giving notice of the summons to the bank
customer. I.R.C. § 7 609(a).
24. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(i) (Supp. 1978). But cf. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (Supp. 1978) (prescribes
some standards for handling financial information once a grand jury has acquired it). The grand
jury is considered to be the single most effective legislative tool in criminal law enforcement
investigations. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 246. Its authority is derived from the
constitution and its procedures are defined by 200 years of legal precedent. Id. The grand jury
may be in need of reform, but the Banking Committee was not considered the place to do it.
Id. For a discussion of the present grand jury system and the need for reform, see Grand Jury
Reform: Hearings on HR. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Interna-
tional Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Reform of the
Grand Jury System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
25. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.
26. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3406 (Supp. 1978).
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neutral and detached magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that
grounds for issuance of the warrant exist. 7 In bank record cases, this
means there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and
that the records maintained by the financial institution contain evidence of
this crime.28
Upon procuring the search warrant, the government authority can serve it
on the financial institution and immediately receive the records. Notice of
this warrant must be sent to the bank customer, but only after his or her
records are released. 29 This notice, therefore, only informs an individual
that a government intrusion into his financial records has already occurred.
The Privacy Commission, in contrast, had recommended that an individual
be notified when "his records are being sought."3 0  The Commission advo-
cated pre-release notice as a means to avoid clandestine government access
to financial records. 31 Proponents of post-release notice, however, success-
fully argued that notice to the customer before his or her records are re-
leased is unnecessary due to the high probable cause standard and the tradi-
tional ex parte nature of search warrant proceedings. 32
The argument for post-release notice was misdirected. Notice of a pending
search warrant generally is withheld in order to insure that a suspect re-
ceives no warnings prior to carrying out an illegal activity and to prevent
him or her from tampering with evidence. 33 When the records sought are
27. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948); Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kemp, 421
F. Supp. 563, 568 (W.D. Pa. 1976). Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt. This has been construed as demanding more than mere
suspicion but requiring less evidence than would be necessary for conviction. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 314 (1st
Cir. 1966); United States v. Davis, 346 F. Supp. 435, 440 (S.D. Ill. 1972); United States v.
Pepe, 209 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D. Del. 1962); United States v. Schwartz, 151 F. Supp. 399, 401
(W.D. Pa. 1957).
28. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir. 1976).
Persons in whose name a safety deposit box was registered applied for return of money seized
from the box by the FBI pursuant to a search warrant. The court held that when a search
warrant is directed to a third party, protection from an unreasonable search and seizure is
provided when there is a finding of probable cause as to two factors-the commission of a crime
and the location of evidence.
29. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3406(b) (Supp. 1978). The government authority has 90 days after receiv-
ing the search warrant to mail a copy of it to the bank customer. Id.
30. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY, supra note 8, at 351 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 352.
32. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 220; Right to Financial Privacy Act Hearings,
supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Robert E. Barnett).
33. Surveillance Hearings, supra note 14, at 714-16 (statement of Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Research Committee). It would be absurd to give an individual notice that his
phone is being wiretapped because he would no longer use that phone. Conversations concern-
ing illegal activities, therefore, would avoid detection. It would be equally absurd to give an
individual notice that his home or office is going to be searched because he would destroy or
falsify any incriminating evidence. Id. at 716.
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in the custody of a financial institution, however, there is no corresponding
opportunity for a customer to destroy or falsify them, 34 or alter his or her
behavior to avoid detection. 35 Therefore, even when a search warrant is
used to obtain financial information, the customer should be notified before
the government receives his or her records from the financial institution. 36
Pre-release notice would alert the customer that records are being seized
so that protective legal measures could be taken. 37 Under the Act, how-
ever, a government authority does not have to give notice to an individual
until ninety days after obtaining the financial records. 38 By the time the
customer receives knowledge that he or she is being investigated, the inves-
tigation could be completed. The customer, therefore, would have no oppor-
tunity to defend his or her privacy interests.
Notice should be delayed until after the records are released only if there
is reason to believe that it will result in endangering the life of anyone in-
volved in the investigation, intimidation of a potential witness, or flight from
prosecution. This would parallel the delay of notice provision presently
applicable when the government obtains financial records through a sub-
34. Id. at 716. The customer does not have access to the original microfilms maintained by
the bank.
35. The only way behavior could be altered to avoid detection is by conducting all one's
business transactions in cash. Given the substantial dependence of society on financial institu-
tions, see note 7 supra, and the fact that financial records are maintained in order to aid the
prosecution of major white collar crimes, see note 2 supra, it is unlikely that any significant
illegal activities can avoid detection. Organized crime syndicates are not likely to run their
entire gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking, or loan sharking operations on a cash only basis.
36. The Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Research Committee recommended giving the
customer notice prior to the probable cause hearing and standing to participate in it. Surveil-
lance Hearings, supra note 14, at 715. The committee thought the customer's input would help
to assure the presence of 'that concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely de-
pends for illumination. . . .' Id. at 717, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The
participation of the customer in the search warrant proceeding, however, would turn the proba-
ble cause hearing into an adversary hearing. This is a concept which is not supported any-
where in the history of search warrants. If search warrants are an accepted means by which
the government may obtain financial records, the traditional procedures surrounding their is-
suance must be followed. Notice should be sent to the customer after the search warrant has
been procured by the government, but before the bank releases the financial records.
37. Unfortunately, the legal measures that are currently available to the customer appear to
be somewhat limited. The present Act lacks an explicit customer challenge provision for search
warrants. See note 132 and accompanying text infra. Also, under existing case law, the customer
probably does not have standing to make a motion to return and suppress any seized records.
See notes 135-36 and accompanying text infra. It is possible, however, that an individual has
an implied right to challenge a search warrant under the Act. See note 138 and accompanying
text infra. Without pre-release notice, this implied right theory will never be tested. Also, if
standing to challenge a search warrant is either judicially or statutorily extended to a customer,
pre-release notice of a search warrant will be an absolute necessity. See note 140 and accom-
panying text infra.
38. See note 29 supra.
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poena or formal written request. 39 Since Congress instead chose to delay
notice of a search warrant until after an individual's records are released, the
burden of protecting financial privacy still rests with 'the judiciary. There-
fore, courts confronted with a request for a search warrant must closely
examine whether the requested records are reasonably described 40 and
whether there is probable cause to believe grounds exist for the issuance of
the warrant. 41
Formal Written Request
The final method by which a government authority can gain access to
financial records is simply to make a formal written request to the financial
institution. 42 This procedure can be used only if no subpoena appears
reasonably available and there is reason to believe that the records sought
are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry. 43 In addition, such a
request must be authorized under the regulations promulgated by the issu-
ing agency or department. 44 Notice of the request and the right to chal-
lenge it must be served upon the customer, or mailed to his or her last
known address, on or before the date the request was made to the financial
institution. 45
39. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(a)(3) (Supp. 1978). The court may delay notice to the customer
for 90 days if the presiding judge or magistrate finds that there is reason to believe notice will
result in:
(1) endangering the life or physical safety of any person;
(2) flight from prosecution;
(3) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or official proceeding or unduly delaying a
trial or ongoing official proceeding to the same extent as the circumstances in the preceeding
subparagraphs.
id.
The fifth reason to delay notice is especially significant. Investigations often involve explor-
ing many leads until the right trail is found. This process can involve the issuance of several
hundred subpoenas. Government agencies and departments were concerned about the cumula-
tive effect of delay if they had to give notice and the opportunity existed to challenge each
subpoena issued. Under this provision, however, a government authority will be able to delay
notice on each subpoena for 90 days if it can show the interconnection of all subpoenas and that
delay of each would cumulatively jeopardize an investigation or unduly delay an ongoing pro-
ceeding. The Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1534-36 (statement of Russell
T. Baker).
40. See notes 101, 102, and accompanying text infra.
41. See notes 27, 28, and accompanying text supra.
42. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (Supp. 1978).
43. Id.
44. Id. The regulations to be issued by each agency regarding the use of the formal written
request should specify the level of employee permitted to make such a request, the cir-
cumstances in which it may be used, the form it must take, and the information it must contain.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 52. These regulations, therefore, will be similar to those
issued by agencies regarding the use of an administrative subpoena, See note 18 supra.
45. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (Supp. 1978).
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The original proposed financial privacy bills did not contain formal written
request provisions. 46 Since many government agencies and departments do
not have administrative subpoena power, 47 these investigative bodies op-
posed the early bills. 48 Under this original legislation, these agencies and
departments would have had to secure a judicial subpoena 49 or a search
warrant 50 before acquiring financial records. Consequently, these govern-
ment authorities predicted that less effective law enforcement would result if
the original financial privacy bills were passed. 51 The formal written re-
quest provision was designed to accommodate these government au-
thorities. 52 The formal written request, however, has other perhaps unin-
tended consequences. During the congressional debate, this provision was
defended as merely codifying and formalizing past practices. 53 Thus, there
is some question regarding the congressional intent behind this legislation. If
Congress actually intended to reverse Miller by legally recognizing a privacy
interest in records maintained by a financial institution, '54 it should have
created procedural barriers to government access to those records. 55
The formal written request operates like an administrative subpoena since
it can be issued without judicial intervention. 56 Enactment of the formal
written request, therefore, runs afoul of the exclusive power of the judiciary
46. See Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 3-20.
47. Id. at 45-46. See also Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS, supra note 16,
at 121 (statement of Richard Thornburgh).
48. The government thought that these bills would seriously impair investigations and shield
law offenders. Id. at 42. The government also feared that these bills would eliminate the use "of
financial records as investigative leads and sources of evidence" and thereby give "organized
crime and white collar workers an unrestricted forum for financial manipulations and conceal-
ment of funds." Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 111 (statement of
William S. Lynch).
49. Bringing an investigation into court to apply for a judicial subpoena was considered too
cumbersome. Id. at 46 (statement of Eugene T. Rossides).
50. This would involve a probable cause hearing which the agencies also thought was bur-
densome. Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS, supra note 16, at 121 (statement
of Richard L. Thornburgh).
51. Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 46 (statement of Eugene T.
Rossides). A "crippling of law enforcement" was predicted. Id.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 221-22.
53. 124 CONG. REc. Hl1,739 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rousselot) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 124 CONG. REC.]. It was argued that prior to the Act, the government could collect
information in this area without any accountability and pursuant to no standards. According to
Congress, the formal written request now merely prescribes criteria for the collection of infor-
mation in these areas. Id.
54. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 was Congress' response to Miller, which held
that an individual has no constitutionally recognizable privacy interest in financial records. H.R.
REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 34.
55. The Privacy Commission criticized the banking system for its lack of procedures imped-
ing government access to financial records. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY, supra note 8, at
349-50. The only procedural change created by this Act, however, is to "formalize" the govern-
ment's informal request for financial records by requiring the request to be in writing.
56. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (Supp. 1978). See also note 18 supra.
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to issue subpoenas necessary to conduct criminal investigations. 57 As Judge
Wyzanski explained in United States v. O'Connor: 5 8 "[tlo encourage the use
of administrative subpoenas as a device for compulsory disclosure of tes-
timony to be used in presentments of criminal cases would diminish one of
the fundamental guarantees of liberty."5 9  By utilizing the formal written
request provision, however, any government agency or department conduct-
ing a civil or criminal investigation can bypass the judiciary in acquiring an
individual's financial records. Thus, the procedures prescribed by the Act do
not create a legitimate expectation of confidentiality with regard to financial
records. 60
57. The basic power to issue a subpoena resides in the judiciary. 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §
2195, at 78 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. Although many agen-
cies are statutorily endowed with subpoena power, there are some circumstances where it is
necessary that this power be retained by the courts. B. MEZINES, supra note 18, § 20.02, at
20-28. One such circumstance is the power to issue subpoenas to gather information for a crimi-
nal case. A court will never enforce civil administrative subpoenas issued solely to conduct
criminal investigations. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1971); Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964); United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 699-700 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Roundtree, 420
F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1969); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1956); United
States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 251 (D. Mass. 1953).
An administrative subpoena will be enforced, however, if it is being utilized to aid a civil
investigation which could potentially result in a criminal prosecution if the subpoena was issued
in good faith and prior to the recommendation for criminal prosecution. Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
58. 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953). The Internal Revenue Service had already closed its
investigation of the taxpayer and made its final report. The Justice Department then requested
an IRS agent to issue a subpoena for the taxpayer's records to aid them in a criminal investiga-
tion. The court refused to enforce the administrative subpoena, stating: "Congress has never in
criminal matters vested the executive with an unrestricted subpoena power to uncover informa-
tion which might aid in the enforcement of criminal statutes and the preparation of criminal
cases." Id. at 250.
Search warrants and grand jury subpoenas are the proper discovery devices for criminal in-
vestigations. United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 808 (E.D. Mich. 1966). Any incon-
venience or injury that a criminal law enforcement agency would suffer as a consequence of
being restricted to these two procedures would appear to be minimal since grand jury sub-
poenas are exempt from the Act. See note 24 supra.
59. 118 F. Supp. at 251. Judge Wyzanski reasoned:
The Constitution of the United States, the statutes, the traditions of our law, the
deep rooted preferences of our people speak clearly. They recognize the primary
and nearly exclusive role of the Grand Jury as the agency of compulsory disclosure.
That is the inquisitorial body provided by our fundamental law to subpoena docu-
ments required in advance of a criminal trial, and in the preparation of an indict-
ment or its particularization ...
Id. at 250-51. Judge Wyzanski's construction of administrative subpoena power in criminal in-
vestigations was accepted by the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517
(1971). The Court stated that "where the sole objective of the investigation is to obtain evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution, the purpose is not a legitimate one and enforcement may be
denied." Id. at 533, citing United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).




Also casting doubt upon the congressional intent to recognize a privacy
interest in financial records is the emergency access provision. 61 This pro-
vision enables a government authority to procure an individual's financial
records without following any of the enumerated procedures if it determines
that the delay entailed by using the procedures would create an imminent
danger of personal injury, serious property damage, or flight to avoid pros-
ecution. 62 In such cases, the government simply may certify in writing to
the financial institution that it has complied with the applicable provisions of
the Act and immediately receive the requested records. Within five days
after receiving the records, a signed, sworn statement setting forth the grounds
for the emergency access must be filed with the appropriate court and notice
must be sent to the customer. 63
Congress apparently recognized the serious potential for abuse inherent in
the emergency access provision when it required every government author-
ity to annually tabulate the occasions when this provision was used. 64 The
potential for abuse stems primarily from the inability of a judge to review
the action taken, despite receipt of a statement from the government outlin-
ing the reasons for emergency access. This odd provision makes little sense
unless Congress truly believes that public scrutiny and congressional over-
sight alone will deter government impropriety.
A preferred approach would have been to borrow the procedure for
emergency wiretapping from the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control
Act. 65 Under the Omnibus Act, a government authority must apply for a
court order approving its emergency wiretap within forty-eight hours after
installation of the tap. 66 If a government agency or department knew that it
would have to defend its emergency request for financial records before a
judge, it undoubtedly would reduce the number of occasions in which the
emergency access provision would be used.
Overall, the procedures of the Act which govern access to financial records
significantly regulate government activity in this area. The government no
longer has the freedom it possessed after Miller to informally obtain financial
information. 67 Indeed, certain procedures must be followed, 68 and notice
must be given to the customer in most situations. 69 Some procedural pro-
61. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b) (Supp. 1978).
62. Id. These conditions are similar to those which must be present in order to delay notice
of the government's request for an individual's financial records. See note 39 supra.
63. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b) (Supp. 1978).
64. Id. Neither the Act nor legislative history.indicate who is to review these tabulations.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976).
66. Id.
67. See note 6 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of informal access to financial
records under Miller.
68. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
69. Notice must be given when financial records are requested by a subpoena or formal
written request. See notes 23, 45, and accompanying text supra.
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visions, however, could have gone further in protecting the individual.
Notice should be sent to the customer in all situations, 70 and the require-
ments under the emergency access provision are too lenient. 71 Also, the
provisions dealing with formal written request 72 and delay of notice 73 ap-
pear to be more concerned with assisting government investigations than
protecting financial privacy.
CUSTOMER CHALLENGE
The Supreme Court in Miller held that an individual possessed no privacy
interest in his financial records that could be vindicated in court. 74 The
customer challenge provision of the Act is the congressional response to that
decision. 75  This provision successfully overturns Miller by generally provid-
ing an individual with automatic standing to challenge the government's ac-
cess to his financial records. 76 This is a significant right for the customer. It
finally enables the courts to hear financial privacy issues and thus develop
case law in this area. The full impact of this right, however, is presently only
speculative, and its development will depend upon how the courts engraft
the standards set out in the Act 7 7 into established legal principles. 78
Subpoena and Formal Written Request
Under the customer challenge provision, an individual has automatic
standing to challenge a request for his or her financial records when they are
sought by subpoena or formal written request. 79 A customer served with
process must file a motion to quash the subpoena or file an application to
enjoin the institution's compliance with the formal written request within
ten days. Otherwise the customer has fourteen days to challenge the gov-
ernment in court. 80 This motion or application must contain an affidavit
establishing the customer as the concerned party. It also must state the
70. Notice should be given to the customer when his records are sought with a search
warrant. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 52, 54-57, and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
74. 425 U.S. 435, 440-46 (1976). See note 5 supra.
75. See note 54 supra.
76. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410 (Supp. 1978).
77. See notes 92, 94, and accompanying text infra for the standards enacted by Congress.
78. Courts will have to revise their view on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" of finan-
cial records so that it can be integrated into the Act's purpose. See note 5 supra for a discussion
of this concept. Other legal principles that will have a role in the evolution of financial privacy
law are good faith and reasonableness. See notes 93, 101, 102, and accompanying text infra.
79. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (Supp. 1978).
80. Id. If a motion to quash or an application to enjoin is not filed within the appropriate 10




applicant's reason for believing either that the records sought are irrelevant
to the law enforcement inquiry or that there was not substantial compliance
with the requirements of the Act. 81
Originally, the Privacy Commission recommended that the government,
as the moving party in requesting the records, also be the moving party in
enforcing its request. 82 Under this approach, the customer would object to
the disclosure of his or her records by notifying the financial institution not
to comply with the government's demand. The government then could seek
enforcement in federal district court and the customer would be allowed to
intervene.8 3  This approach avoids the customer's "terrific burden of talking
[sic] on the whole U.S. Government." 84
Congress instead chose to require that the customers initiate the court
action. This procedure probably places too much responsibility on the indi-
vidual. 85 Nevertheless, this burden is ameliorated to a degree because the
burden of proof regarding the relevance of the records to a law enforcement
proceeding rests solely with the government. 86 Even with this require-
ment, Congress realized that the law enforcement community received "an
undeserved concession when the burden of going to court first was placed
on the individual." 8 7
81. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (Supp. 1978). The original proposal of the customer challenge
provision required the customer to show "a factual basis for concluding that there is no reason
to believe that the financial records sought contain information relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement purpose." 124 CONG. REC., supra note 53, at H11,727. The customer, therefore,
could not simply make allegations but would have to state facts to support his position. Failure
to meet this standard would result in dismissal of the customer's complaint. To ensure that
there would be no barriers to the customer's ability to judicially challenge a government request
for his financial records, Congress removed any customer proof requirement. He now can
merely allege his reasons for believing the financial records sought are irrelevant. Id. at
H11,734.
82. The Privacy Commission recommended utilizing the procedure of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 for a taxpayer's challenge of an IRS summons when it is directed to a third party. Under
this procedure the government is the moving party. The Commission, however, recommended
greater substantive protections than those extended in the Tax Act. PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY, supra note 8, at 360.
83. This is the procedure that is currently in effect under the Internal Revenue Code.
I.R.C. § 7609(b).
84. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 237 (statement of Hon. Stewart B. McKinney).
85. See generally 124 CONG. REC., supra note 53, at H11,731 (remarks of Rep. Rousselot);
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 10, at 53. It is too demanding to expect that everyone will
have the knowledge and experience to initiate a legal proceeding. Also, individuals often are
intimidated by the government. A challenge, therefore, may never even be contemplated since
it is often felt that the government always gets what it wants.
86. 124 CONG. REc., supra note 53, at H11,731 (remarks of Rep. Rousselot); H.R. REP.
No. 1383, supra note 10, at 53. The customer does not have to demonstrate that the records are
irrelevant. Id. See also note 81 supra.
87. 124 CONG. REc., supra note 53, at Hl1,732 (remarks of Rep. Rousselot). This conces-
sion was probably due to the resistance of government agencies and departments to the enact-
ment of financial privacy legislation. These government authorities claimed that any restrictions
on their access to financial records would seriously impair criminal, tax, and regulatory investi-
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When enacting the customer challenge provision, Congress also was aware
of the need to provide the individual with a legally recognized interest that
can be asserted in order to protect financial records. 88 Procedural defenses
alone do not create a privacy interest. 89 Without a defined substantive
right of privacy in financial records, "an individual given notice, standing,
and the right to challenge a government request for his records would have
little basis for any real challenge." 90  The substantive standard that Con-
gress created for financial privacy is relevancy. 91
Once the customer has filed a motion to quash the subpoena or an appli-
cation to enjoin the formal written request, the government must meet a
two-pronged standard of proof. First, the government authority must prove
that a demonstrable reason exists for believing the law enforcement inquiry
is legitimate. 92 The government usually can meet this good faith standard
by showing that the request does not exceed the agency's authority, and the
individual is not being harassed. 93 Second, the government authority must
prove that it is reasonable to believe the records sought are relevant to the
inquiry. 94 Thus, relevancy is the standard which must be met in order to
overcome the customer challenge. Any inspection, however, "throw[ing]
light upon" an investigation generally is held to be relevant. 95
gations. These authorities also were afraid that customer challenges to their requests for finan-
cial records would "flood the courts." See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS,
supra note 16, at 103-29; Right to Financial Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 117-56; The
Safe Banking Act of 1977 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1529-81, 2686-970.
88. The need to provide the individual with a legally recognized interest was reported by
the Privacy Commission. See note 8 supra.
89. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY, supra note 8, at 352.
90. Id.
91. See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
92. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(c) (Supp. 1978).
93. 124 CONG. REc., supra note 53, at Hl1,736 (remarks of Rep. Stark). An administrative
subpoena will not exceed an agency's authority if it is issued for a purpose that is authorized by
statute. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7602 which authorizes the Secretary of the IRS or his delegate to
issue subpoenas
[for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability. ...
If any IRS subpoena is issued for any reason beyond these purposes, it is exceeding the agency's
authority.
A subpoena is harassing an individual if it is issued in order to put pressure on the individual
to force him or her to settle a collateral dispute. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58
(1964). For a general discussion of abuses in administrative orders, see Jaffe, The Judicial En-
forcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HAR V. L. REv. 865 (1963).
94. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(c) (Supp. 1978).
95. United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 96, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976) (IRS subpoena to a corpora-
tion to produce computer tapes comprising part of the corporation's financial record-keeping
system); United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 1973) (IRS subpoena to compel
tax preparer to produce names and social security numbers of clients whose tax returns he had
prepared); United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
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Due to this minimal standard, the customer challenge provision on its face
does not offer the individual an extensive right to financial privacy. Although
procedurally the individual has the right to go into court, under this rele-
vancy standard, the basis for challenging the government's request is so nar-
row that it will almost inevitably lead to disclosure. 96 Courts, however,
could vigorously review whether the requested records are reasonably de-
scribed. 97 This issue has not been extensively litigated. Prior cases dealing
with government requests for financial records usually involved Internal Rev-
enue Service subpoenas requesting information to be used in order to ver-
ify specific items on an individual's tax return. The Internal Revenue Service
in these cases, therefore, was able to identify the specific records it re-
quired. 98 Also, prior to the Act, only a bank had the right to challenge a
1074 (1970) (IRS subpoena to attorney to produce specified books, records, and papers of his
corporate client); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1959) (IRS subpoena to
bank to produce all records concerning a corporation and a named taxpayer); United States v.
Mellon Bank, 410 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (IRS subpoena to bank to produce list
of entries by named taxpayers into their safety deposit boxes); United States v. Campbell, 390
F. Supp. 711, 713 (D.S.D. 1975), aff'd, 524 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1975) (IRS subpoena to taxpayer
to produce handwriting exemplar to compare with writing on checks); United States v. Acker,
325 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (IRS subpoena to corporation to produce minutes of
meetings).
Normally, records and documents will be deemed relevant and an individual can rarely con-
vince a court otherwise. See cases cited supra. See also United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141
(1975) (John Doe subpoena to bank to discover identity of any person who has had bank transac-
tions suggesting possible unpaid taxes); Ryan v. United States, 379 U.S. 61 (1964) (IRS sub-
poena to taxpayer ordering him to produce his books); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48
(1964) (IRS subpoena to company president to produce records of the corporation); United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (FTC summons to corporations to submit special
reports); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968) (IRS subpoena to attorney
requiring him to produce records regarding alimony payments to his client, the wife of the
taxpayer under review); United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967) (IRS subpoena to
appraisor to produce a report he made on a certain piece of real estate).
United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973), is one of the rare cases where the
court held that documents sought were irrelevant. In Matras, the Internal Revenue Service
issued a summons requesting the defendant's proposed budgets for two years. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court decision that these budgets were irrelevant to the determina-
tion of the defendant's tax liability since the budgets were only projections of transactions. Any
records, however, that actually resulted from these transactions would be relevant. Id. at 1272.
96. United States Attorney General, Griffin B. Bell, thought that a customer would have
virtually no chance to enjoin a government request for his financial records under a relevancy
standard. He, therefore, viewed the customer's ability to challenge as simply a delay tactic.
Administrative Sunsuwiss and Anti-Disclosure Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Over-Sight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30-31 (1977) (statement of Griffin B. Bell).
97. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. The government authority does not have to
describe every document it wishes to inspect in minute detail, but it must be able to describe
them with "reasonable particularity." First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d 532,
535 (5th Cir. 1947).
98. See, e.g., Ryan v. United States, 379 U.S. 61 (1964) (IRS request for specified records);
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (IRS request for certain records relating to 1958 and
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request for records and often it did not question whether the description was
reasonable. 99
Under the Act, all government authorities are required to reasonably de-
scribe the records they request, and unlike the Internal Revenue inves-
tigators, these authorities often are not following the blueprint of a tax re-
turn. 100 Also, the customer now has the right to challenge a government
request for financial records. The customer is more likely to be concerned
with defeating a government request than the bank, since individual privacy
interests are at stake. The issue of description, therefore, should become
important. Requiring some precision in the description of the requested rec-
ords may tighten the relationship between the relevance of the records and
the investigation being conducted. A general description usually indicates
the government is on a "fishing expedition." '0' In contrast, if the govern-
ment authority can identify particular records, it is more likely that an inves-
tigation of a specific violation is being conducted. 102 Strict judicial scrutiny
of the description of the requested records could then have the effect of
1959 returns); United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976) (IRS request for specified
reels of computer tapes stating the corporation's expenses and losses); United States v. Hart
rington, 388 F.2d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1968) (IRS request for certain records relating to taxpayer's
property settlement); United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 175 (5th Cir. 1967) (IRS request
to produce an appraisal report relating to a certain piece of real estate).
99. Although the government made general requests for all records in United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976), and in Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir.
1959), the banks never raised the issue whether the records were reasonably described, and
thus it was never litigated. 425 U.S. at 446 n.9, 265 F.2d at 188.
100. An income tax return will not aid investigations of bribery, gambling, drug trafficking,
loan sharking, or extortion. Items relating to these kind of operations are not usually found on a
return.
101. Government requests for records will not be complied with:
if they are too general, too wanting in specification, as to indicate that they are
merely exploratory fishing expeditions. [The government] is not entitled ... to
have the Bank produce all its records merely in order for [it] to go through them for
the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the Bank possesses any records which
may or may not be relevant to the . . . investigation.
First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1947) (refused to
enforce an IRS subpoena requesting the bank to produce all books, papers, records, checks, and
drafts that were kept for six years pertaining to four named individuals). See also United States
v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The Internal Revenue
Service requested all the records for a six year period concerning certain named individuals and
any family members not named. The court refused to enforce the request and stated that the
government "must specify what records it wants and what specific persons whose records are
wanted, and not merely designate the records of a given family." Id. at 614.
102. This appears to be the court's reasoning in United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,
385 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1967). The Internal Revenue Service had requested the bank to
produce " 'All records relative to other accounts during the years 1961 through 1964, such as
records of other securities bought or sold for said * * * (customer(s)) or other transactions of any
nature handled by the bank on behalf of said * * * (customer(s)).' " The request for "records of
other securities bought and sold" was held to be sufficiently precise. The balance of the request,
however, was too indefinite and therefore not enforced. Id.
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enlarging the customer's basis for challenging a government request for fi-
nancial records.
In examining two other standards considered by Congress when enacting
this legislation, it is evident that a stricter substantive standard could have
been created in the customer challenge provision. The first financial privacy
bill that was proposed would have required a government authority, when
challenged, to show "probable cause which would be sufficient to support
the issuance of a valid search warrant to obtain the financial records if the
financial records were in the home of the customer."' 0 3  Probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. This
has been construed as demanding more than mere suspicion but requiring
less evidence than would be necessary for a conviction."0 4
Government officials considered this standard to be too strict and opposed
it. 105 They argued that rarely does probable cause exist when a request for
financial records is made because access to financial records usually is one of
the initial steps in developing an investigation. 106 The government felt that
an entire investigation often could be blocked if probable cause was required
at this stage. 10 7  This standard, therefore, was rejected. 108
The other standard proposed in Congress was to provide the customer
with "the same rights as if the records were in his possession." 109 Under
this standard, an individual would have the same fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights in financial records as in private papers. This is the type of
privacy interest that was recommended by the Privacy Commission.
110
This standard, however, was rejected on the belief that it would deny access
to all records in the event the individual decided to exercise his or her right
against self-incrimination. I" By creating the legal fiction of possession in
the customer, this standard also would have extended the right to claim the
fifth amendment privilege. 112
103. Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 18-19.
104. See authorities cited in note 27 supra.
105. Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 53 (statement of Eugene T.
Rossides).
106. Id. at 90.
107. Id.
108. The next financial privacy bill that was proposed did not contain a probable cause stan-
dard. See The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 7. For a discussion of
the standard that was proposed, see note 109 and accompanying text infra.
109. Right to Financial Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 9; The Effect of the Bank
Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 7.
110. The Privacy Commission recommended creating a protectible interest in records main-
tained by a financial institution that reflects the protections for private papers that are articu-
lated in the fourth and fifth amendments. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY, supra note 8, at 363.
111. Right to Financial Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 36 (statement of Bill Brock);
The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 132-33 (statement of M. James
Lorenz).
112. The privilege against self incrimination is allowed when the person seeking to invoke the
fifth amendment has possession of the information the government is seeking. See Couch v.
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After Congress rejected this standard, the right to assert the fifth amend-
ment privilege in response to a government request for private papers was
seriously undermined in Fisher v. United States. 113 The Supreme Court in
Fisher held that an accountant's workpapers, because they are not prepared
by the taxpayer, do not contain the taxpayer's compelled testimonial declara-
tions and, therefore, do not come within the protection of the fifth amend-
ment. 114 Since an individual does not prepare the records maintained by a
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), where the petitioner asserted the fifth amendment privilege
when she challenged an Internal Revenue Service summons that directed her accountant to
produce business records that she had given him for preparation of her tax returns. The Court
denied her challenge, stating that "the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege: it
adheres basically to the person, not to the information that may incriminate him .... It is the
extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense of justice." Id. at 328.
See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944); United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d
464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967).
For a further discussion of the requirement of possession in order to invoke the fifth amend-
ment, see Note, Constitutional Law-Taxation: A Taxpayer Who Has Demonstrably Relin-
quished Possession of Her Financial Books and Records to an Accountant Cannot Prevent En-
forcement of a Summons Directed to the Accountant for Production of Such Records by Invok-
ing Her Right to Privacy and Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 211
(1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination -Compulsory Produc-
tion of Taxpayer's Business Records in Third Party Possession Held Not Violative of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, 19 VILL. L. Rv. 186 (1973).
113. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The
Role of a Hierarchial Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 62-67 (1977-1978) [hereinafter cited
as McKenna]; Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 971-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy].
114. 425 U.S. at 409. The Fisher Court upheld a subpoena directing the taxpayer's attorney
to surrender workpapers prepared by the taxpayer's accountant. The Court reasoned that the
subpoena would have been valid even if it required the taxpayer to produce the accountant's
workpapers that were in his own possession. Although these papers are based solely on financial
information that the taxpayer gives to his accountant, they are not actually prepared by the
taxpayer and thus they do not contain any testimonial declarations made by him. id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Fisher Court questioned whether the fifth amendment pro-
tects an individual from complying with a subpoena for documents since the very act of produc-
ing them may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating evidence. Id. at 410-11.
Some commentators subscribe to this view. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2264, 379-80,
where he stated:
It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a person . . . in response
to a subpoena . . . or to other form of process relying on his moral responsibility for
truthtelling, may be refused under the protection of the [fifth amendment]
privilege. . . . [T]here is a testimonial disclosure implicit in their production. It is
the witness' assurance, compelled as an incident of the process, that the articles
produced are the ones demanded.
Although realizing that an element of compulsion is present with a subpoena, the Court in
Fisher did not think that a taxpayer's admission of the existence and possession of an account-
ant's workpapers would rise to the level of testimonial self-incrimination for purposes of the
fifth amendment. 425 U.S. at 410-11. The Court stated that:
The papers belong to the accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind
usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client. Surely
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financial institution, they also do not contain any testimonial declara-
tions. 115 Accordingly, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination would not be available to a customer even if he or she had
possessory rights in the financial records. Under this standard, financial pri-
vacy would then be left with only fourth amendment protections.
Under the fourth amendment, a government authority does not have to
show probable cause for enforcement of a subpoena for private papers. 116 If
the investigation is conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, the private
papers sought are relevant to that purpose, and the information requested is
reasonably described, the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amend-
the Government is in no way relying on the 'truthtelling' of the taxpayer to prove
the existence of or his access to the documents. . . The existence and location of
the papers are a forgone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers. Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons 'no constitu-
tional rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.'
Id. at 411, quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911). The Court then developed the
argument that the taxpayer is not competent to authenticate the accountant's workpapers either
through compliance with a subpoena or through oral testimony. Id. at 412-13. The basis of this
argument was that since the taxpayer did not prepare the papers, he could not vouch for their
accuracy. Id. at 413.
Whether the fifth amendment protects an individual from producing records that he prepared
and that are in his possession, was specifically left open in Fisher. Id. at 414. Dicta in Andresen
v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), however, indicates that an individual would be protected in
that situation. Documents containing statements made by the petitioner were seized in Andre-
sen. The petitioner tried to suppress these papers by claiming the seizure violated his fourth
and fifth amendment rights. The Court dismissed the fifth amendment claim, but indicated that
this protection probably would have been available if a subpoena had been used to obtain the
documents. Id. at 473-74. For a further discussion of this case, see Note, Private Papers Now
Subject to Reasonable Search and Seizure-Andresen v. Maryland, 26 DEPAuL L. REv. 848
(1977).
For cases illustrating the Supreme Court's prior treatment of testimonial communications, see,
e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (blood sample); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,
252-53 (1910) (donning a blouse worn by the perpetrator of the crime).
115. Like the records prepared by the accountant in Fisher, the records maintained by a
financial institution are not prepared by the customer and thus do not contain any testimonial
declarations made by him. See note 114 supra. The customer may write the checks, but the
bank microfilms them and prepares the deposit slips and statements. It is these records that are
prepared by the financial institution that a government authority requests and not the original
checks.
116. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (IRS does not have to meet a
standard of probable cause to have a summons enforced); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (FTC can investigate "merely on suspicion that the law is being vio-
lated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not"); Oklahoma Press Publish. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946) (the investigative functions of the administrative subpoena
power under the Fair Labor Standards Act must not be limited by any predictions concerning
the probable results of the investigation).
1078
FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT
ment is satisfied and the administrative 117 or judicial118 subpoena will be
enforced.
Although this is essentially the same standard presently found in the
Act, 119 this standard for subpoenas has been criticized greatly in recent
years. 120 A supboena is considered less instrusive than a search warrant,
which often involves rummaging though one's personal belongings, 121 but
the privacy interest is in the papers themselves. This interest is infringed
upon whether the papers are obtained through a subpoena or a search war-
rant. 122 Courts, therefore, have been urged to adopt a stricter standard for
enforcement of subpoenas that is somewhere between relevancy and proba-
ble cause. 123 If the Act provided the individual with the same rights in his
financial records "as if they were in his own possession," the standard for the
customer challenge provision would have automatically incorporated any case
law changes. By enacting a fixed standard of relevancy, the Act may not be
amenable to any stricter standards which might be judicially adopted. 124
An even greater impact would be found in situations involving the formal
written request if the individual had possessory rights in his financial rec-
ords. Since the formal written request is a new method of obtaining infor-
mation, the applicable standard would have to be determined by the courts
on a case by case approach. Thus, courts could require probable cause when
financial records are sought for use in a criminal investigation and require a
lesser standard for a civil investigation. 125
117. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub-
lish. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861, 866 (1961); SEC
v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§ 53.08, at 67 (3d ed. 1972).
118. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-702 (1974); United States v. lozia, 13
F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
119. See notes 11, 92, and 94 and accompanying text supra.
120. See Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy, supra note 113,
at 985-91; McKenna, supra note 113, at 84-91; Note, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 626, 632-36 (1974); Note, The
Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions of an "Intimate Relationship," 13 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 857, 866-70 (1966).
121. The court in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), stated that
a subpoena "is much less intrusive than a search warrant: the police do not go rummaging
through one's home, office, or desk if armed only with a subpoena." Id. at 130.
122. McKenna, supra note 113, at 89: The Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), held that the compulsory production of papers by a subpoena is within the
scope of the fourth amendment because it essentially accomplishes the same purpose. Id. at
622. A subpoena, like a search warrant, forces an individual to forfeit his property. Id. This
holding remains persuasive and subpoenas should "be held to be within the protective ambit of
the fourth amendment." McKenna, supra note 113, at 86-87.
123. See generally authorities cited in note 120 supra.
124. See notes 127, 128, and accompanying text infra.
125. The use of a relevancy standard to enforce a formal written request for information to be
used in a criminal case echoes Judge Wyzanski's statement in O'Connor, that the use of an
administrative subpoena in a criminal investigation "would diminish one of the fundamental
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Even though a fixed standard of relevancy was adopted by Congress in the
Act, 126 the courts should attempt to achieve the same results which would
have occurred if the individual had possessory rights in the financial records.
The courts, therefore, should not set a different standard if they decide to
give more protection to an individual's private papers. A different standard
would not lead to greater protection of financial privacy. 127 Instead, the
relevancy standard itself should be tightened through stricter judicial con-
struction in both private papers and financial records cases. 128 This is
where the true significance of the customer's ability to come into court and
challenge the government becomes apparent. 129
Since courts now can hear financial privacy cases, the relevancy standard
can be developed to reflect varying privacy interests. Thus, the amount of
light an inspection of financial records must throw upon an investigation in
order to be relevant 130 would depend upon the court's perception of the
relation between the facts of the case, the government's purpose, and the
right to privacy. Under this approach, relevancy could gradually become a
stricter standard. This analysis also would enable the courts to demand more
from the government to prove relevancy when a criminal charge is involved.
Congress may have enacted a certain standard for protecting disclosures of
financial records, but the final interpretation and application of this standard
to each financial privacy case is up to the courts.
Search Warrant
Another concession to the government in the customer challenge sec-
tion 131 is the noticeable absence of any provision dealing with search war-
rants. 132 Congress apparently felt that the right to make a motion to return
guarantees of liberty." 118 F. Supp. at 251. See notes 58, 59, and accompanying text supra. A
civil subpoena that is enforced under a relevancy standard has never been allowed in a criminal
investigation. See note 57 supra. Thus, a standard resembling probable cause should be dem-
onstrated by the government when a formal written request is used to obtain records in a
criminal investigation.
126. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
127. If a different standard was adopted, see note 123 and accompanying text supra, it would
not be applicable to the Act because of its specific statutory language requiring relevancy.
See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
128. Since the standard is fixed in the Act, the only way financial privacy can receive more
substantive protection is by making the standard itself stricter. Established legal principles such
as good faith and reasonableness could be used by the courts to accomplish this purpose. See
notes 93, 101, and 102 supra.
12 9 q See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
131. There are two other concessions to the government in the customer challenge provision.
The first concession is to require the customer to be the moving party in the challenge. See
note 87 and accompanying text supra. The second is the use of the relevancy standard. See note
94 and accompanying text supra.
132. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410 (Supp. 1978).
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and suppress evidence acquired by a search warrant under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 133 was adequate. 134 Unfortunately, the limita-
tions on standing to challenge search warrants 135 make this protection insuf-
ficient. In order to have standing, the "movant must claim either to have
owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial posses-
sory interest in the premises searched." 136 The search and seizure of an
individual's bank records does not meet any of these requirements. Hence,
the customer lacks standing to move for the return of records the govern-
ment acquires from his or her financial institution through a search warrant.
If Congress had provided the customer with the same rights in his financial
records "as if the records were in his own possession," 137 the possession
requirement would be met and the customer would have standing to motion
for the return and suppression of his records.
It is possible that portions of the Act could support an argument that a
customer of a financial institution has standing to challenge a search war-
rant. 138 The absence of an explicit provision, however, probably will be
fatal. 139 If the courts do not imply such a right, it would be wise for Con-
133. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) provides that:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court .. .for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful
possession of the property which was illegally seized .... If the motion is granted
the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any trial
or hearing. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in
the district of trial after an indictment on information is filed, it shall be treated also
as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
134. The Privacy Commission also incorrectly arrived at this conclusion. PRIVACY PROTEC-
TION STUDY, supra note 8, at 363-64.
135. Only a "person aggrieved" by an unlawful search and seizure has standing to make a
motion to suppress evidence. United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973);
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 360-61 (1974). The
Supreme Court has defined a person aggrieved as: "a victim of a search and seizure, one against
whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the
use of the evidence gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure directed at someone
else." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
136. 362 U.S. at 261. The defendant in Jones was staying at a friend's apartment when it was
searched by federal agents and narcotics belonging to him were seized. Since the defendant was
the owner of the seized items, he was allowed to make a motion to suppress the evidence that
was seized. See also Boyle v. United States, 395 F.2d 413, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1968), where the
court held that the defendant did not have standing to present a motion to suppress the evi-
dence of seized cancelled checks that implicated him in income tax evasion. These checks were
owned and in the possession of a third party.
137. See note 109 supra.
138. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3406 (Supp. 1978). This section states that after a government authority
obtains an individual's financial records through the use of a search warrant, he "may have
rights under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978." It could be argued that an individual's
right to challenge a search warrant can be implied from this general language.
139. Since Congress explicitly provided for a customer challenge in the subpoena and formal
written request situations, see note 79 and accompanying text supra, the absence of such a right
when search warrants are used probably indicates a congressional intent not to provide standing
to challenge a search warrant.
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gress to amend the Act to allow customer challenges of search warrants di-
rected toward financial institutions. 140 Although an ex parte probable cause
hearing does subject a government's request for records to the scrutiny of
judicial review, this is no substitute for an adversary challenge hearing.
Without a right to challenge, there is no way to assure that the government's
request for financial records is justified.
CONCLUSION
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 is significant because it creates
a procedural and substantive right to privacy in an area where the Supreme
Court previously held that none existed. 14 1  Even though the procedural
provisions could have been more protective of the bank customer, 142 they
will help regulate clandestine and undocumented government access to fi-
nancial records. 143 The most significant aspect of the Act, however, is that
it gives the individual standing to come into court and substantively chal-
lenge a government request for his financial records. 144 Although Congress
did set a rather minimal standard which must be met by the government to
overcome such a challenge, 145 it is up to the courts to interpret and apply
this standard to the financial privacy area. 146 Thus, it appears that Con-
gress intended to create the right to financial privacy but wished to have the
courts develop it through case law.
Karen Anne Kuenster
140. Congress either should provide the individual with possessory rights in his financial
records so he has standing to make a motion to return and suppress evidence, or create a
customer challenge provision for search warrants resembling the one presently in effect for
subpoenas and formal written requests.
141. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
142. See generally notes 36, 37, 52, 54-57, 64-66, 82-85, and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 13, 14, and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 94, 95, and accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 128-130 and accompanying text supra.
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